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Abstract 
Curiosity spends roughly 70% of the day "sleeping", in order to recharge the batteries from the nuclear power source. The system 
is designed to ensure the Rover goes to sleep and wakes back up to continue science and engineering activities. Additionally, the 
design is robust to off-nominal situations that may need additional actions performed by both hardware and software to ensure 
the Rover can communicate with the Earth. This paper describes nominal and off-nominal behavioral patterns, fault tolerance 
features designed into the Rover system (hardware and software), several off-nominal scenarios that are accommodated by the 
design, and some lessons learned from this development effort. 
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1. The Curiosity Mission & Background 
The Curiosity Rover landed on Mars in August, 2012, and immediately started to study Gale Crater. Curiosity is 
an ambitious design, with many instruments, a driving capability, a robotic arm, and an articulating mast, all 
powered by a single 114 W Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG). 
 
Figure 1: The Curiosity Rover 
The energy demands of the Rover exceed the energy production capability of the MMRTG. This fact made it 
necessary to create a system that allowed the Rover to integrate and store the generated energy over periods of time 
when the energy demands of the Rover could be guaranteed to be less than the energy production capability of the 
MMRTGs. We created an operational state of the vehicle called the sleep state. In this state, most of the loads on the 
vehicle are turned off, including the computer that controls the normal communication sessions and science 
gathering activities. While the loads on the Rover are off, and the Rover is functionally quiescent (asleep), the 
MMRTG produces sufficient energy to charge the two 43 Amp-Hour Lithium-ion batteries. When the Rover wakes 
up from its slumber and resumes its activities, it draws power from the MMRTG and from the replenished 
(recharged) batteries. 
Given this sleep capability, the design was required to have a robust wakeup design because the computer is 
needed to communicate with Earth and to perform science activities. Communication with the Mars Reconnaissance 
Orbiter (MRO) or the Odyssey orbiter must be initiated at prescribed times, based on their availability. Direct to 
Earth communication must be done when the Earth is above the horizon. Science gathering activities, driving, 
robotic arm movement and imaging are usually done in the daylight hours, when the sun provides visibility and 
warms the actuators. 
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Additionally, the shutdown and wake up design was required to be operationally easy to use, because the Rover 
needed to shut down and wake up several times a day. The design was also required to be robust to a failure of any 
single device and the system needed to adapt to off- nominal situations to ensure that the operations team could 
regain control of the system. These guidelines led to two distinct behavioral design patterns that control the cadence 
of the Rover’s activities over individual Sols1. The first such cadence is the nominal cadence controlled by 
sequences uplinked daily by the Mission Operators. The communication passes and science activities all fit into this 
general control pattern. This cadence is active as long as the Rover is healthy. The second cadence, a fault response- 
induced cadence, controls the Rover’s communication sessions and wake-sleep cycle when the Rover experiences a 
significant fault event. 
2. Shutdown and Wakeup Process 
Figure 2: Simplified block diagram of shutdown and wakeup components 
The primary components of the wake-sleep design are the dual Rover Compute Elements (RCEs), the dual Power 
Analog Modules (PAMs), and the dual UHF radios (Figure 2). The RCEs host the Flight Software (FSW) and 
control the daily activities when the Rover is awake. The PAMs contain the power control functionality (switches) 
that allows the FSW to turn various loads on and off (heaters, science instruments, etc.). Dual 1553B data buses 
allow the FSW to communicate with the PAMs. 
Upon going to sleep, the FSW stops all of the FSW-controlled autonomous behaviors, turns devices off that are 
not needed while sleeping, stops the FSW modules from writing to FLASH memory, sets the alarm clocks in the 
PAMs (to indicate a planned wakeup time), and then tells the PAMs to turn off the switches that power the RCEs. 
When the alarm clocks expire, a Field-programmable gate array (FPGA) in each PAM runs a script to turn on the 
switch to the primary RCE. The CPU in the RCE boots up, the FSW initializes and the Rover is ready to roll. 
3. A Day in the Life 
Figure 3 shows a timeline of a typical day on Curiosity. Sequences are uplinked to the Rover during the X-band 
high-gain antenna communications window, around 10 a.m. Science, arm movement, and driving usually occur 
during the middle of the day, when the sun has warmed the actuators and less heating is needed. Communication 
with the orbiters, via UHF, is performed between 2 and 5 a.m., and 2 and 5 p.m., depending on the orbiters’ 
geometry. The Rover may be sequenced to wakeup during the night to turn on any of the overnight instruments. 
During normal operations, the team sequences the shutdown using a single command. Upon receipt of this 
command, the FSW sets the alarm clocks in both PAMs to the appropriate duration based on the desired time to 
 
 
1 A Sol is a Martian day = 24h 37m 22.663s. 
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resume the sequence or the next communications window. If the next wakeup is for a communications window, the 
Rover will wake up, set up for communicating with the orbiter or directly to Earth, then autonomously shut down 
after the session has completed. If the next wakeup is to perform science, the Rover will wake up and resume the 
sequence where it left off. 
 
Figure 3: Timeline of a typical day on Curiosity 
If a severe failure occurs, the vehicle is autonomously put into safing mode. A safing day (Figure 4) plays out 
differently than a nominal day. All the instruments are turned off, and the Rover sleeps whenever it is not attempting 
to communicate with the Earth or an orbiter. The Rover wakes up at 2 a.m. and turns on the ElectraLite UHF radio. 
When an orbiter comes into view, the orbiter “hails” the Rover with its own radio, syncing the communication, and 
the Rover sends up telemetry and receives commands. After the orbiter goes over the horizon, the FSW sets the 
alarm clock for the next communications window and puts the Rover back to sleep. At 8 a.m., the Rover wakes up 
and initiates a receive-only X-band window. At 9 a.m., the Rover turns on the X-band transmitter and sends a tone 
(with no telemetry) to Earth for 50 minutes. After that, the Rover returns to the receive-only mode to wait for Earth 
to send commands. At 11 a.m., it returns to sleep in order to recharge the batteries. At 2 p.m., the Rover wakes again 
to wait for a hail from the orbiters. The times and types of communication are configurable. 
 
 
Figure 4: Timeline of a safing day 
4. Fault Tolerant Features 
Given the need to sleep (to recharge the batteries) and the need to wake up (to collect samples and communicate 
with Earth), the wakeup-shutdown function was required to be single-fault tolerant. Our early analyses examined 
functional failure modes across all the affected components and examined the impact of the postulated failures. 
Then we evaluated the overall robustness of the design to the postulated failures. These failure cases ultimately 
drove improvements in the hardware designs and helped derive the requirements on FSW for the recovery actions 
needed to address unplanned fault-induced wakeup events. Oddly enough, many of the failure modes with the 
Rover’s wake-sleep design have functional analogies in the biological domain. For example, faults could 
conceivably occur that could cause behavior analogous to narcolepsy (falling asleep unexpectedly), or insomnia (an 
inability to sleep), or sleep apnea (repeated unexpected wake events). Additionally, more prosaic, but equally 
important, fault modes existed that could be triggered in the wake-sleep control path or outside the control path. 
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4.1. Equipment 
The PAMs are home to the capability that allows the RCEs to be powered off during a sleep cycle and they 
contain the alarm clocks and mission clocks that allow the PAMs to wake up the Rover at a pre-planned time, and 
also allow the Rover to re-seed its internal knowledge of mission time in a fault tolerant manner. 
The PAMs contain a power management state machine that is coupled with a programming language that allows 
various intelligent and customizable actions to happen on each state transition arc. This intelligent control is stored 
in EEPROM within the PAMs, allowing the intelligence to be upgraded and enhanced as the design progressed. As 
the design progressed, this added intelligence became affectionately called the “lizard brain” of the Rover. The heart 
of this capability resides in an FPGA in each PAM. 
4.2. FPGA design 
Most of the intelligence ascribed to the PAM was implemented in FPGAs designed at JPL. The FPGA 
instantiated the following functionality: alarm clocks (with a snooze function), telemetry controller for a 128-
channel analog front end and ADC, 1553B bus interfaces, Remote Serial Bus (RSB) interfaces, mission clock, non-
volatile memory storage controller, and volatile memory storage controller. 
The FPGA design provides many fault tolerance capabilities. It incorporates logic to support SECDED (single 
error correction, double error detection) error protection of the volatile and non-volatile memory regions and write 
protection of the memory space under software control. The FPGA also supports the autonomous swap out of 
memory when a DBE is detected, allowing faulty memory to be replaced following a hardware memory failure. 
The FPGA power management state machine (aka wake-sleep state machine) is implemented as a synchronized 
self-checking pair, to provide fail-safe protection against state machine errors. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) 
is used on all registers. 
Each FPGA has two independently programmable alarm clocks to allow different reactions based on which alarm 
clock expires. The alarm clocks also incorporate a “snooze” function that attempts to initiate a wakeup after a 
programmable interval if the first wakeup event is not effective. The FPGA is also designed to send a wakeup signal 
to the backup PAM following a loss of power, power-on reset (POR) detection, or based on the internal detection of 
a power management state-machine fault. 
The FPGA provides functions based on external devices. The FPGA can react to low battery or under-voltage 
indications, as well as “power positive” indications that may be used by a solar powered mission. There are two 
inputs for external wakeup signals, hooked up to the UHF radios, allowing each PAM to be fully cross-strapped to 
each UHF radio. The cross-strapping insures that the design is equally tolerant to PAM or UHF radio failures. 
Finally, a watchdog is implemented in the FPGA to detect state-machine inactivity, which may be used to induce 
a wakeup, allowing the FSW to detect and isolate the problem. 
4.3. PPROM language 
The intelligence embedded in the PAMs is coded in a custom machine-level programming language native to the 
FPGA. The programming language includes traps for unimplemented instructions, improperly implemented 
instruction arguments, branch error detection mechanisms, and the capability to verify the integrity of the code base 
prior to execution of the code. 
The code loaded into EEPROM is called “Personality” PROM or PPROM. This moniker is used because the 
behavior of every PAM on the spacecraft could be individually customized with actions appropriate to the PAM’s 
functional role in the wake-sleep behavior. The PPROM code is triggered whenever the internal state machine is 
driven to a new state by detected events. 
The hardware design provides four EEPROM banks for potentially four different sets of PPROM instructions. 
This is particularly useful when using different FSW versions. The FPGA will autonomously switch from the 
selected bank to a designated default bank if any of the errors described above are encountered. 
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4.4. PPROM design 
The Curiosity PPROM design captures expectations regarding the nominal behavior of the RCE on wakeup and 
then takes additional fault recovery response actions if the nominal expectations are not met. The “expectations” of 
Rover behavior are really a conceptual model of how the Rover should behave in various nominal and off-nominal 
scenarios. In many cases the process relies on a closed loop handshake between the RCE and the PAM. An example 
of this behavioral model is illustrated during the process of a normal Rover wakeup. When the primary alarm clock 
timer expires, the PAM powers on the designated preferred RCE. The computer boots up and is expected to 
acknowledge that it has properly booted by clearing specific bits in the FPGA. If this action is not completed 
successfully in the two minutes allocated for the RCE to boot up, the PAM issues commands to turn on the alternate 
RCE. Two minutes later, if there is no acknowledgement from either CPU, the PPROM will turn off both 
processors, and try again, this time with the secondary computer first. If neither processor boots up properly, the 
PPROM will turn off both RCEs and set the alarm clock to wait five hours before attempting another wakeup. This 
allows the batteries to recharge before the next wakeup attempt. 
4.5. Flight Software 
The integrated dual PAM design is focused on getting at least one RCE turned on, especially since meaningful 
communication with Earth can only be done using the FSW. The FSW operating in the RCE is the fault detection, 
isolation, and recovery authority for most PAM faults. It is the job of the FSW to identify PAM faults, to take 
misbehaving PAMs offline, and to begin using the redundant PAM if necessary. Once the RCE is turned on and the 
FSW boots up, the FSW must read the breadcrumbs left in the PAM registers and isolate the offending PAM. The 
system then enters safing mode, as shown in Figure 4. 
Similarly, while the Rover is awake, the FSW must monitor the PAMs for failures and ensure at least one PAM is 
working before the system is put back to sleep. Additionally, the FSW is responsible for coordinating the 
communication sessions at the correct times as well as instigating the autonomous shutdown to ensure that the 
batteries will recharge. 
5. Failure Scenarios 
Given all the built-in fault tolerance, how does the integrated system play out? This section describes the 
autonomous response to several anticipated failure scenarios. 
Inability to wake up – If the preferred RCE fails to boot and acknowledge both PAMs in the prescribed time, the 
custom PPROM code will power on the backup RCE. That RCE will boot up. The FSW takes over control and 
initiates safing mode. 
Alarm clock breaks – If the prime PAM fails to turn on the appropriate RCE, either due to a failed switch or a 
failed alarm clock, the PPROM in the redundant PAM will power on the backup RCE five minutes later, using the 
redundant switch. The system will then enter safing mode. 
Insomnia – If the Rover fails to go to sleep because a switch or FPGA fails, the RCE remains on. The FSW 
forces a processor reset (because most of the FSW modules have already been stopped by this time). When the FSW 
boots back up, if it doesn’t detect another problem with the FPGA, it will attempt the shut down again. After a few 
resets, the FSW will put itself in isolation mode and the PPROM code will turn on the other RCE. When that RCE 
boots up, the FSW will attempt to turn off the first RCE and it will detect the stuck on switch. The FSW will run a 
fault response to isolate the broken PAM by removing the FPGA’s power. Now that RCE will initiate safing and the 
system can go to sleep. 
Sleep apnea – If the Rover can’t stay asleep, the PAM turns on the RCE at the wrong time. While awake, the 
FSW checks the alarm clock settings and verifies that all alarm clocks in both PAMs are correctly counting down. If 
they count down incorrectly, the FSW isolates that PAM. So if the Rover wakes up early due to the oscillator 
running fast, the FSW will detect the problem and isolate the PAM. This type of failure leads to safing. 
Narcolepsy – If the RCE switch unexpectedly powers off while the Rover is awake, the PAMs are programmed 
to turn it back on within a minute. If that RCE’s switch is permanently broken, the PAM will turn on the backup 
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RCE. If the problem is with the prime PAM, the backup PAM will turn on the backup RCE using the backup 
switches. The newly “prime” RCE will initiate the safing mode following this type of failure. 
Too busy to go to sleep – If the operations team forgets to sequence the vehicle shutdown, the battery control 
board will detect a low voltage on the battery cells and set a register. Autonomous FSW will run a system response 
to shut down the vehicle as fast as possible, setting the alarm clocks to 16 hours, which will allow the batteries to 
fully charge up. The system will be placed in safing mode on the next wakeup. 
Run out of energy while sleeping – If the overnight instruments drain the batteries, the PAMs start a PPROM 
script in reaction to the under-voltage signal. This PPROM code will isolate any PAM with a potentially stuck 
switch, and then set the alarm clocks to 16 hours. When the Rover wakes back up, the FSW reacts to the under-
voltage breadcrumbs by putting the system in safing. 
Clock loses power during sleep – If the PAM experiences a loss off power while the RCE is asleep, the POR state 
of the FPGA’s cross-string output asserts a wakeup signal to the other PAM. When the system wakes up, the FSW 
detects the POR signal in the breadcrumbs, so it uses the mission clock value from the “good” PAM, and isolates the 
PAM that lost power. This type of failure will lead to safing. 
Clock runs fast or slow – With just two mission clocks available, it is difficult to distinguish which clock is right. 
Absolute time is critical to communicating with the Earth and the orbiters. So upon wakeup, FSW reads the mission 
clock from both PAMs and if they differ by a prescribed amount, the system enters a “hail wakeup” mode. In this 
mode, the prime UHF radio is turned on and left on while the Rover sleeps. When an orbiter hails the Rover, the 
radio asserts a signal to the PAM, which initiates a wakeup. When FSW boots, it starts to communicate with the 
orbiter. When the orbiter sets over the horizon, the Rover goes back to sleep with the radio powered on. The 
operations team may issue commands to the Rover through the forward-link capability of the orbiters during these 
communication sessions. This behavior allows the Mission Operators to wake up the Rover and acquire diagnostic 
data using an external orbiter-generated wakeup event. 
6. Lessons Learned 
The shutdown and wakeup system came together well, in part because a lot of nominal and off-nominal testing 
was done at all levels of development. We tested the FPGA first in a stand-alone configuration, and then the FPGA 
integrated into the PAM. In this configuration, we checked out the PPROM language and fail-safe features. 
Next we unit tested the customized PPROM code for Curiosity and then a single PAM integrated with the FSW. 
Finally, we tested the dual PAMs integrated with the dual RCEs in flight-like scenarios, both nominally and 
inducing faults. The nominal wakeup functionality was tested daily because it was used to boot up the Testbeds as 
well as the real Rover in the spacecraft assembly facility. 
Our Testbeds weren’t all hardware-rich, but there was one Testbed that contained fully redundant RCEs and 
PAMs. This Testbed allowed full fidelity testing of all wakeup-shutdown functionality. Unfortunately this was also 
the only Testbed that could be used by the Entry, Descent, and Landing team, so there was a lot of contention for 
test time. The existence of this high fidelity Testbed was a huge plus. However, the contention for this test facility 
created scheduling conflicts and delays in testing. Having this high fidelity test venue was absolutely required. 
Having an additional Testbed with similar capabilities would have eased test congestion and improved overall 
schedule performance. The choice to not create an additional high fidelity Testbed was largely cost driven. The cost 
of new hardware was very well known. The cost of schedule congestion was not well understood. In the end, the 
decision was made to rely on only a single high fidelity Testbed. This proved to be adequate but painful. The lesson 
here is to have at least one facility that allows testing of the real hardware with its internal software and the FSW. 
Schedule-constrained projects with multiple independent development activities competing for the same test venues 
should seriously consider increasing the number of high fidelity Testbeds above the bare minimum. 
Our greatest challenge was designing the FSW to correctly detect a specific fault, because the system design 
often assumed the behavior based on a few conditions; but when real faults were introduced, several unexpected 
symptoms would show up. Our original design used incomplete information that was misinterpreted by the FSW 
when the RCE was powered up following a sleep session. This led the FSW to turn off the switch that was holding 
up the RCE’s power. In essence, this challenge resulted because the inherent complexity of specific fault cases did 
not match the simplified models that we used to describe the system and which were used in formulating portions of 
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the fault protection design. This ultimately led to several upgrades in FSW capability as our models were adjusted to 
account for our deeper understanding of the complexities inherent in the fault scenarios that we were trying to 
address. The Rover’s FSW at landing still had some issues with some of these failure modes, but we were able to 
prove that the system would eventually recover, if somewhat clumsily. Five days after landing, we loaded a new 
FSW version that fixed the wakeup issues. 
Other issues in the wakeup-shutdown functionality were discovered after landing. The first step to shutting down 
is to stop autonomous activities. Unfortunately, the system does not stop all the autonomous activities (this was a 
system design miss). This ultimately resulted in the Rover leaving an instrument in the wrong state overnight. The 
lesson learned is to reexamine the autonomous behavior of the system several times during the design phase.  
The wakeup-shutdown functionality was designed around two different assemblies (the PAMs and the RCEs) 
that could both control resources critical to maintaining the health of the entire Rover. When the RCE was powered 
off, FSW was not running and PPROM code was solely in control of the resources. When the RCE was powered on 
and FSW was fully booted, then control of the Rover‘s critical resources was passed to the FSW. Resource 
ownership and contention became an issue in several fault scenarios. An example of this was 1553B bus fault 
protection. In this scenario, communication between the RCE (FSW) and the PAMs could be interrupted for long 
enough to trigger one of the PAM’s internal watchdogs. The PAMs autonomous actions could then interfere with the 
RCE’s efforts to recover the 1553B bus. The resource contention and fault coupling that were inherent in the 
architecture of the Rover added to the complexity of the FSW that had to address these issues. Additional out-of- 
band signaling or control could have vastly simplified this process but the linkages were not understood soon 
enough to make the requisite changes in the hardware. 
7. In-flight Experience 
Curiosity has performed the shutdown and wakeup functions several times a sol, with no issues since landing, 
except on Sol 200. On that day, a couple of FSW bugs were illuminated when Curiosity’s main RCE experienced a 
memory chip failure. The outcome was that the sequenced shutdown command was “locked out” so the rover did not 
start the shutdown actions. The operations team decided to swap RCEs by sending two hardware commands that 
forced the primary RCE into a mode where FSW isn’t running. This action invoked the behavior described in the 
“Narcolepsy” scenario. Three minutes after the main RCE reset, the PAM turned on the backup RCE. When this 
RCE booted, it took over control of the rover and entered safe mode. 
8. Conclusions 
Given the planned mission duration, the Rover’s entire wake-sleep functionality was designed to be completely 
single fault tolerant. When the final design was completed, the system is actually tolerant to individual failures in 
several redundant assemblies, since the control chain used to implement this functionality passed through more than 
one cross-strapped assembly. The final design is able to tolerate individual failures of several redundant assemblies 
in the control path as long as no two redundant pairs were both eliminated. 
Testing proved to be best tool available for validating the fault-tolerant design. The single hardware-rich test 
venue allowed us to inject faults into the integrated system, and to see the behavior play out in a flight-like way. 
Adjustments were made to the FSW design to better react to the various faults that could occur while the rover was 
sleeping. Future projects with multiple complex development designs should consider increasing the number of high 
fidelity Testbeds to accommodate potential schedule conflicts. 
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